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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,

:

v.

:

RONNIE LEE GARDNER,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 21027

Priority 1

:

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

It was not plain error for the trial court not to

have given the jury a limiting instruction on the use of
defendant's statements that were repeated by Officer Jorgensen on
rebuttal to defendant's denial that he made the statements.

It

was not at all clear to the trial court that the evidence came in
other than substantively and, thus, the court could not have been
expected to recognize the issue.

This is especially true where

defendant did not object to the evidence as violating his Fifth
or Sixth Amendment rights.

Even if there was plain error, it was

not prejudicial in light of the overwhelming evidence of
defendant's guilt and rehearing should be denied.
II.

Even if the manslaughter instruction was

incorrect, defendant was not entitled to the instruction under
his theory of the case and the error was harmless.

Defendant's

alleged extreme emotional disturbance was the product of his own
criminal activity, and he was ineligible for the manslaughter

mitigation that he asserted.

Any error was also harmless because

defendant was found guilty of the greater offense and cannot
complain that the instruction on the lesser offense was wrong.
III.

The trial court's instructions did not preclude

the jury from considering the manslaughter defense, but even if
they did, there was no prejudice to defendant.

Even if the jury

had considered the manslaughter option, it would necessarily have
rejected it because the crimes were the direct product of
defendant's own criminal activity.
IV.

This Court need not rule on defendant's claim that

introduction of the prior violent felony aggravating circumstance
at the guilt phase is unconstitutional because there are other
grounds upon which his conviction can be affirmed.

Defendant's

escape, and thus his incarceration, were integral facts of the
crime which the jury would hear regardless of a bifurcated guilt
proceeding.

Also, defendant voluntarily offered his own

extensive criminal record and having invited any error cannot now
claim that he was prejudiced.

Further, there were two other

aggravating circumstances supporting the first degree murder
conviction.

Finally, there was overwhelming evidence of

defendant's guilt and introduction of his prior record was
harmless.
V.

The mitigation evidence offered by defendant was

irrelevant to defendant's history or the nature of the crime.
The trial court properly excluded this evidence and the evidence
about other capital defendants because it did not relate to the
defendant.

While mitigation evidence is generally very broad, a

-?-

trial court retains its traditional authority to exclude
irrelevant evidence even though the defendant labels it as
mitigating.
VI. & VII.

The jury instructions and the verdict forms

did not create a presumption that death was the appropriate
penalty nor shift the burden of proof to defendant.

The jury was

informed that the State must prove that aggravation outweighed
mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt.

They were not instructed

to presume death nor that they must unanimously find mitigation
before it could be weighed against the aggravation.

Thus, Utah's

capital sentencing procedures are constitutional.
VIII.

This Court appropriately determined that counsel

was effective on the three issues it treated that were raised in
defendant's pro se pleadings.

The issue of prejudice may be

determined from the trial record without having first determined
whether counsel performed deficiently.

Thus, an evidentiary

hearing would provide no further assistance to the Court on the
issue of prejudice and is not necessary.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
IT WAS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE TRIAL
COURT NOT TO LIMIT THE JURY'S USE OF WAYNE
JORGENSEN'S TESTIMONY.
Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred
in admitting defendant's prior inconsistent statements in
rebuttal to his denial of the statements because they were
obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
and Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).

This Court

held that admission of the statements was proper to rebut
defendant's inconsistent testimony regardless of Miranda or
Massiah violations.

The Court further found that it was not

manifest error for the trial court not to have instructed the
jury sua sponte to limit its use of the evidence to credibility.
On petition for rehearing, defendant claims that this Court
should have found manifest, reversible error in the trial court's
failure to give a limiting instruction.

Defendant's claim fails

because, if there was error, it was not manifest and it was
harmless.
In State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 553 (Utah 1987),
this Court stated that it will review issues in death cases which
were not preserved in the trial court, but will reverse a
conviction based upon these errors only if they are manifest and
prejudicial.

Manifest or "plain" error is one that should have

been obvious to the trial court.

State v. Holland, 111 Utah Adv.

Rep. 8, 12, n.3 (June 22, 1989), referring to State v. Eldredge,
101 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 18-19 (Feb. 1, 1989).

If this Court

determines that an error was not plain, it need not continue on
to the prejudice issue.

If the error is plain, it "is

prejudicial only if . . . absent the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the defendant."
v, Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1255 (Utah 1988).

State

This Court's

confidence in the outcome must be undermined by the error, or no
prejudice will be found.

Ld.

Applying these standards to the

issue at hand, this Court properly found that there was no
reversible error.

First, it is not clear that such a limiting instruction
was required.

This Court has not previously ruled that limiting

instructions are required when prior inconsistent statements are
offered.

Also, there is some criticism of the use of limiting

instructions which suggests that juries do not understand such a
subtle distinction in the use of the evidence.

See e.g.

United

States v. Sisto, 534 F.2d 616, 624-25, n. 10, 11 (5th Cir. 1976).
From the face of the hearsay rule, it appears that no
limiting instruction is needed.

Prior inconsistent statements

are not hearsay in Utah if the declarant testifies and denies
having made the statement.

Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A).

The

purpose of a limiting instruction is to prevent the jury from
using hearsay statements, that may not be reliable, for the truth
of the matter asserted.

If, on the other hand, the statement is

not hearsay, a limiting instruction would be purposeless.
Wigmore, Evidence §1018, 996 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).

See 3A

As the

United States Supreme Court held in California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149 (1970), where the declarant appears at trial, any prior outof-court statements are admissible substantively and do not
violate the right to confrontation.
In the case of statements obtained in violation of
Miranda or Massiah, unless there is some indication that the
statements were involuntary, no purpose would be served by a
limiting instruction because the statements of a defendant do not
become unreliable simply because of a technical violation of
Miranda or Massiah.

Cf. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306, 312

(1984); (defendant's voluntary statements taken in violation of

Miranda admissible in rebuttal to defendant's contrary testimony
because defendant may not use these prophylactic rules as a
shield from his own perjury); Harris v. New Yorkf 401 U.S. 222,
224-26 (1971) (defendant has no license under Miranda to commit
perjury free from risk of confrontation with his own statements).
Analogously, a confession, which is an admission of a party
opponent, is not hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) and such a
statement does not require a limiting instruction.
This Court need not reach the issue of the substantive
use of defendant's statements, however, because it has disposed
of the issue on manifest error analysis.

Because there is no

Utah case law on the subject, and because there is disagreement
whether a limiting instruction is required, this Court
appropriately determined that there was no reversible error.
Also supporting this Court's finding that there was not
manifest error is the fact that the trial court was not even
alerted that there was any problem with admission of the
statements on Miranda or Massiah grounds.

Consequently, the

Court never made any findings upon the issue and this Court
cannot determine from the state of this record whether there was
such an error.

If there was no error of this sort, the

statements could clearly have come in substantively as statements
against interest under Rule 801(d)(2)(A).

Unless the trial judge

was alerted to the possible limited use of defendant's statements
for impeachment only, it is likely that the judge believed the
statements came in substantively and, therefore, could not have
been expected to address the issue sua sponte.

Defendant also asserts that most jurisdictions that
have admitted statements obtained in violation of Miranda or
Massiah have done so in cases where a limiting instruction was
given.

While United States v. McManaman, 606 F.2d 919 (10th Cir.

1979) did use a limiting instruction, the court did not hold that
such an instruction was required.

Also, the instruction actually

used in that case did not in fact limit the jury's use of the
statements.

The court quoted with approval the following

language:
[the tape is] to be used by you only in
connection with or as to the question of
impeachment of the testimony of the
defendant. In other words, as to whether or
not his testimony is truthful in view of the
tape which you heard. You have to decide
that issue. You have the issue as to what
you wish to believe and that is part of your
duty in determining the facts.
McManaman, 606 F.2d at 924 (emphasis added).

This language is

unclear in that it appears initially to limit the use of the
statements, but in the highlighted portion, appears to approve
its substantive use.
In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), while the
trial court gave a limiting instruction, the United States
Supreme Court did not hold that the instruction was necessary.
Indeed, the Court even noted that both counsel argued

the

substance of the statements and did not find that such
substantive use was improper.

401 U.S. at 223.

Defendant also asserts that it was error for the court
not to have given a limiting instruction to the jury because the
efftfo

«Red defendant's statements in closing argument to show

defendant's intent to kill.

Harris disposes of this issue, but

even if it was error for the prosecutor to use the statements
substantively, there was other overwhelming evidence of intent
and it is unlikely that the jury would have found otherwise if
they were instructed not to use defendant's statements
substantively.
Similar to Harris, in Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714
(1975), the trial court gave a limiting instruction.

The Supreme

Court noted that the instruction was given, but did not use this
fact to support its finding that the statement was properly
admitted.

420 U.S. at 717.
Finally, State v. Walker, 138 Ariz. 491, 675 P.2d 1310

(1984), does state that such a limiting instruction is required.
Noticeably, however, the Arizona court did not cite to any
authority for the proposition, nor did it analyze the issue in
any way.
Even if this Court determined that there was plain
error, it correctly declined to reverse defendant's conviction
because there was overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt in
this case and, thus, no prejudice from admission of the evidence.
More specifically, there was overwhelming evidence that defendant
intended to kill Michael Burdell.

Defendant knew that he would

find a gun underneath the drinking fountain in the courthouse
that day.

Defendant took the gun that he found there and fired

at the prison guards several times before he was wounded.
Because the gun was a single-action revolver, defendant had to
cock the hammer each time he fired.

After he was wounded, he went into the clerk's office
and fired at Burdell who was hiding behind the door, point blank.
He must have first cocked the gun as he aimed at Burdell because
the gun will not fire without first being cocked.

He then left

the room, fired at a court bailiff, returned to the clerk's
office and told another prison employee to "come on, you asshole"
and show him a way out of the building.

Upstairs, he took a

vending machine delivery man hostage and stated "You are next.
Walk with me."

Defendant then exited the building.

While defendant may have been acting spontaneously, he
was not acting like the confused person he claimed to be. All of
his actions were calculated to obtain what he was seeking—his
freedom.

From his actions and his statements made to victims at

the scene, there is overwhelming evidence from which the jury
determined that he intended to kill.

Given all of the evidence

indicating defendant's guilt of first degree intentional murder,
it was not manifest and prejudicial error for the trial court not
to have instructed the jury to use defendant's statements only
for assessing credibility.
Because there was not manifest and prejudicial error in
the trial court failing to give a sua sponte limiting
instruction, defendant is not entitled to rehearing on this
issue.

This Court did not overlook or misapprehend the facts or

the law in reaching its conclusion that there was not manifest,
reversible error and it should deny rehearing.

POINT II
THIS COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT DEFENDANT WAS
NOT ENTITLED TO A MANSLAUGHTER INSTRUCTION,
AND, THUS, THAT ANY ERROR IN THE GIVEN
INSTRUCTION WAS HARMLESS.
At defendant's request, a manslaughter instruction was
given at trial.

Defendant objected to a portion of the

instruction which stated:
For Manslaughter to apply, the 'extreme
mental or emotional disturbance' must be
triggered by something external from the
accused, and his reaction to such external
stimulus must be reasonable, and the terms
must be given the meaning you would give them
in common everyday use. Such disturbance
therefore cannot have been brought about by
the defendant's own peculiar mental processes
or by hie intentional knowing or reckless
acts .
Instruction 34 (emphasis added).

This Court found that the

instruction, while erroneous in stating that the emotional
disturbance must be viewed objectively rather than subjectively,
was correct in stating that the emotional disturbance could not
be brought upon by one's own criminal acts.

Defendant requests

rehearing claiming that this interpretation precludes juries from
considering manslaughter in many of the traditional manslaughter
cases.

Defendant's characterization of the Court's opinion is

mistaken.
Defendant outlines at length circumstances in which he
claims that juries would be precluded from considering
manslaughter where the act of killing is preceded by some type of
crime which he claims places the hypothetical defendants in
circumstances like his. Defendant misses the point of this

Court's decision.

It is not merely the fact that the killing was

preceded by another crime that eliminates the manslaughter
option.

It is the fact that the emotional disturbance which

defendant claims mitigates the killing to manslaughter was
produced by the preceding crime that eliminates the manslaughter
option.
Defendant's hypothetical situations are not situations
in which the actor's criminal activity produced the emotional
disturbance.

For instance, the "grief-stricken parent" who kills

someone with an illegally concealed weapon does not suffer from
an emotional disturbance as a result of carrying the weapon.
Rather, this person kills as a result of their reaction to the
death of their child which they mistakenly believe is the fault
of the victim.
Defendant, on the other hand, killed as the result of
his reaction to the situation in which he intentionally placed
himself—the escape attempt.

He asks this Court to ignore that

the triggering act for his disturbance reached back beyond the
point in time when he was wounded to his intentional escape
attempt and focus upon the wound he received as the triggering
act.

What defendant forgets is that his wound was produced by

his escape plan.

His resulting disturbance, therefore, was

produced by his criminal acts.
Defendant is mistaken in his belief that this Court's
opinion precludes a manslaughter defense where the defendant was
involved in any separate crime.
stand for that proposition.

This Court's opinion does not

Rather, this Court held that this

defendant's crime produced the disturbance that he claims
mitigates the first degree murder to manslaughter.

It would be

a ludicrous result if any person who attempted to escape lawful
custody could claim as mitigation of intentional murder the fact
that he was upset when his escape plans went awry either because
of his unfamiliarity with the gun or because he was wounded.
Defendant's situation is precisely the type that the
commentators to the Model Penal Code envisioned.

It is a

situation in which, as defendant states, the "offender [was]
culpably responsible for the disturbance."

App. Br. at 13. As

defendant further states, the commentators do "not state that in
all cases where a defendant was involved in a crime, manslaughter
does not apply."

Ld.

They do state, however, that manslaughter

does not apply where the defendant has "intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly, or negligently brought about his own memtal
disturbance, such as by involving himself in a crime."

Model

Penal Code §210.3 (official draft & revised comments, 1980, Part
II, at 64).
Finally, defendant completely ignores this Court's
comment that defendant cannot complain of an improper
manslaughter instruction because he was convicted of first degree
murder.

State v. Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 13 n.2 (Utah

Jan. 31, 1989).

For this reason, defendant's request for

rehearing to "clarify in its opinion that involvement in another
crime does not automatically preclude a finding of manslaughter"
should be denied.

POINT III
THE INSTRUCTIONS ALLOWED THE JURY TO CONSIDER
THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES, BUT EVEN IF THE
JURY CONSIDERED THE MANSLAUGHTER DEFENSE, IT
WOULD HAVE REJECTED IT, THUS, DEFENDANT WAS
NOT PREJUDICED.
Defendant asserts that this Court erred in finding that
the jury instructions read as a whole allowed the jury to
consider the lesser included offenses without first having
unanimously acquitted defendant of first degree murder.

He

argues that he was prejudiced by the instructions because, under
the extreme emotional disturbance theory of manslaughter, the
jury could find that he committed an intentional or knowing
murder but still find him guilty of manslaughter.

If, according

to defendant, the jury understood the instructions to require
them not to consider the lesser included manslaughter
alternative, they would stop after convicting him of first degree
murder and never consider whether he suffered from a disturbance
that mitigated the crime to manslaughter.
Defendant is correct in his assertion that the extreme
emotional disturbance theory of manslaughter mitigates an
intentional or knowing murder.

Consequently, in a case where a

defendant has raised a legitimate extreme emotional disturbance
defense, a jury should probably be directed to consider the
existence of such a disturbance after a finding of intentional or
knowing murder.

However, this Court need not reach this issue in

this case because defendant did not raise a legitimate
manslaughter defense.

Defendant's only theory of manslaughter was that he was
upset and confused by the events that occurred as a result of his
escape attempt.

As argued in Point II, above, his so-called

"disturbance" was produced by his own intentional, knowing or
reckless criminal acts.

For this reason, defendant was not even

entitled to a manslaughter instruction and any error in the trial
court directing the jury not to consider manslaughter until after
it acquitted defendant of first degree murder would have been
harmless if it occurred.
Furthermore, even if the jury had reached the issue of
manslaughter, it would have had no choice but to eliminate it as
an alternative because defendant's criminal acts could not be the
basis for his claim that he suffered from an extreme emotional
disturbance.

Because the trial court's instruction was correct

in limiting application of extreme emotional disturbance
mitigation to circumstances where defendant was not culpably
responsible for his disturbance, there was no error even if the
court restricted the jury from considering the inapplicable
mitigation defense.
POINT IV
THIS COURT NEED NOT RULE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PRIOR VIOLENT FELONY
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE BUT MAY AFFIRM
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION ON OTHER GROUNDS.
Defendant complains that this Court did not find the
introduction of prior convictions as an aggravating circumstance
in the guilt phase of a capital trial to be a violation of due
process.

He requests this Court to rehear the issue and find

such a violation or to give him the retroactive benefit of State

v. James, 99 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 18-19 (Utah Jan. 6, 1989).

This

Court need not, however, address the constitutional or James
issues because, even if it was constitutional error to introduce
defendant's two robbery convictions as proof of aggravation at
the guilt phase, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
As noted in the opinion in this case, introduction of
defendant's two robbery convictions was not prejudicial for
several reasons.

First, defendant's escape from custody was

evident from the facts presented to the jury about the crimes for
which he was on trial.

It would have been evident even if the

State had not charged or attempted to prove escape as an
aggravating circumstance.

Further, contrary to defendant's

assertion, the jury could not have been made aware that defendant
was escaping from lawful custody without their inferring that
defendant was at least charged with a prior crime.

The fact that

the State offered only the two robbery convictions, may actually
have reduced the danger that the jury would speculate on the
nature of the convictions or charges that caused his
incarceration.
Second, defendant took the stand during the guilt phase
and introduced the remainder of his extensive record voluntarily.
Any restriction on the State's evidence would have been undone by
defendant's own testimony.

Granted, in the context defendant

offered the convictions, in a case where prior convictions were
not elements of the crime; the jury could properly have been
instructed to limit their use of the convictions to credibility,
but defendant was not in such a position.

Third, there were two other aggravating circumstances
supporting the first degree murder conviction.

The fact that the

jury found these other circumstances undermines defendant's claim
that he should receive a new trial because the prior conviction
aggravating circumstance is unconstitutional.

Even if this Court

did strike this circumstance for the initial guilt phase
determination on constitutional grounds, defendant cannot evade
the other two aggravating circumstances and any error in the
introduction of the two robberies would be harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Defendant complains that the prosecutor argued all of
his convictions on the issue of his intent to commit murder.
This, defendant claims, is impermissible under Utah R. Evid.
404(b) (1989) because it was used "to prove [his] character . . .
to show that he acted in conformity therewith."

Id.

What

defendant overlooks is that Rule 404(b) also states that evidence
of other crimes is admissible as "proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident."

If the prosecutor was doing as defendant

suggests, i.e. using his prior convictions on the issue of
intent, the prosecutor was following Rule 404(b), not violating
it.

Defendant's claim in this regard is, consequently,

meritless.
Defendant also asserts that the prosecutor improperly
used defendant's extensive felony record to impeach his
credibility in closing argument.

Defendant requests this Court

to ignore that he offered the very convictions that the

prosecutor referred to and to find that there was plain error in
the introduction of these convictions.

Therefore, defendant

asserts that this Court cannot rely on his introduction of the
evidence to support the harmless error analysis.

Defendant

overlooks that invited error is not tolerated even in a capital
case.

State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 561 (Utah 1987).

Defense

counsel was apparently under the impression, as were many in Utah
prior to State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986), that all
prior felony convictions were admissible to impeach the
credibility of the defendant.

Be that as it may, defendant

testified to these convictions without moving to suppress them.
He, thus, invited any error in their introduction and has waived
any claim that they were inadmissible.

Given that the

convictions were in evidence, defendant was not prejudiced by the
prosecutor's use of them for impeachment of defendant's
credibility.
Finally, as the Court acknowledged, there is
overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt in this case. There
is also overwhelming direct evidence of defendant's intent which
is outlined in Point I, above.

Defendant argues that the most

persuasive evidence of intent was Wayne Jorgensen's recitation of
defendant's comments in the hospital.

The State disagrees and

asserts that the most persuasive evidence of defendant's intent
was that he had to cock the gun each time he fired it, that he
did so even though he claims that he was unfamiliar with the gun
and surprised that it did not fire initially, that he ordered a
bystanding prison employee to show him a way out of the building

after shooting both Burdell and Kirk, and that he told a vending
machine delivery man that he was "next."

These facts create a

clear picture of intent regardless of defendant's assertion to
the contrary.
POINT V
THIS COURT PROPERLY AFFIRMED THE TRIAL
COURT'S EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE OFFERED BY
DEFENDANT AS MITIGATION BECAUSE IT WAS
IRRELEVANT.
Defendant offered in mitigation testimony of associates
and family members of Michael Burdell that Burdell would not have
wanted defendant to receive the death penalty.

He also offered

affidavits from defense attorneys and prosecutors in other
capital cases summarizing the facts and mitigating and
aggravating circumstances.

The trial court refused to admit this

evidence and this Court affirmed stating that the evidence was
irrelevant to the character of defendant and the nature of his
crime.

In his petition for rehearing, defendant again insists

that this evidence was relevant and should have been admitted
because the United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant
is entitled to present "unlimited mitigation."

App. Br. at 31.

Defendant is wrong in his assertion that mitigation is completely
unlimited and, therefore, this Court correctly affirmed the
exclusion of the evidence defendant offered.
In Penry v. Lynaugh#

U.S.

, 109 S. Ct. 2934

(1989), the United States Supreme Court revisited the limitation
of mitigating factors in capital cases.

The Court reiterated the

principle that "punishment should be directly related to the
personal culpability of the criminal defendant."

109 S. Ct. at

2947.

The Court in no way retreated from its statement in

Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1986), that the traditional
authority of a trial court "to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence
not bearing on the defendant's character, prior record, or the
circumstances of the offense" is not limited by this principle.
Defendant's renewed argument on this issue is merely a repetition
of his initial argument insisting that the evidence was relevant.
On its face, nevertheless, the evidence defendant
offered was not directly related to his personal culpability.
Evidence that defendant happened to choose as his victim a
bystander who did not believe in the death penalty is not
relevant to his culpability and its consideration would not
"reflect a reasoned moral response to [his] background,
character, and crime." Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2934 (citation
omitted, emphasis deleted).

Rather, the evidence did represent

an attempt by the defendant to have the jury consider the
question that is more appropriately left to the Legislature:
whether the death penalty is appropriate in any case.

The trial

judge correctly excluded this evidence and this Court correctly
affirmed.
Defendant points out that the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari in South Carolina v. Gathers,
, 109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989).

U.S.

Since defendant filed his petition

for rehearing, Gathers was decided.

In Gathers, the Court again

stated that a -defendant's punishment must be tailored to his
personal responsibility and moral guilt."
omitted).

Ijd. at 2210 (citation

The Court went on, nonetheless, to uphold the judgment

of the South Carolina Supreme Court reversing Gathers' death
sentence on the ground that evidence that the victim was a
religious man was "unnecessary to an understanding of the
circumstances of the crime."

Id.

The South Carolina court went

on to say that the prosecutor's references to the victim
"conveyed the suggestion appellant deserved a death sentence
because the victim was a religious man and a registered voter."
Id. (citation omitted).
Thus, the United States Supreme Court reiterated that
information about the victim that does not relate directly to the
circumstances of the crime is inadmissible.

The Court noted that

there was no evidence that Gathers had read the prayer card
carried by the victim and, therefore, the contents of the card
were irrelevant to the circumstances of the crime.

Similarly,

defendant did not know that Burdell opposed the death penalty
when he shot him and the fact was, therefore, irrelevant to the
circumstances of the crime.
The affidavits defendant offered were also unrelated to
his background or crime.

Comparing other defendants with this

defendant as this Court stated "would shed no further light on
defendant's crime, but would instead encourage the jury to
consider information extraneous to defendant's character and the
circumstances of his offense."

State v. Gardner, 101 Utah Adv.

Rep. 3, 11 (Jan. 31, 1989)(emphasis added).
Regardless of defendant's repeated assertions, the
evidence was simply irrelevant on the issue for which he offered
it.

The trial court was, therefore, not required to admit it and

this Court properly affirmed its exclusion.

POINT VI
THE PENALTY PHASE INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICT
FORMS DID NOT CREATE A PRESUMPTION THAT DEATH
WAS THE APPROPRIATE PENALTY.
For the first time, defendant asserts that the penalty
phase instructions and verdict forms impermissibly created a
presumption that death was the appropriate penalty.

He urges

this Court to find that there was manifest and prejudicial error
requiring rehearing and reversal even though the issue was not
previously raised or noted by this Court.

This issue does not

merit rehearing or reversal, however, because there was no error.
In Jackson v. Dugger, 837 F.2d 1469 (11th Cir. 1988),
cert, denied, 105 S. Ct. 2005 (1988), the court reversed a death
sentence because the jury received the following instruction:
When one or more of the aggravating
circumstances is found, death is presumed to
be the proper sentence unless it or they are
overridden by one or more of the mitigating
circumstances provided.
Id. at 1473.

The Eleventh Circuit found that this instruction

was inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court's direction
that capital sentencing must be an individualized determination
allowing for consideration of mitigating factors relevant to the
particular offender or the offense.
The instructions defendant points to in his case are
not like the instruction in Jackson.

None of the instructions

quoted by defendant express any presumption to the jury^
fact, they are stated in either-or terms.

In

They do not tell the

jury that they must impose death unless defendant provides
mitigation that overrides the aggravation.

In fact, defendant

ignores that the jury was instructed that the State must
establish that the aggravation outweighs the mitigation beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Thus, the jury could not have presumed that

death was the appropriate penalty.

The jury could have decided

not to impose death even if the mitigation was merely equal in
weight to the aggravation because in that instance, the State
would not have carried its burden.
Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1988),
cert, pet, filed, March, 1989, is also distinguishable.

The

Arizona scheme was found unconstitutional there because the
defendant was required to establish the existence of mitigation
by a preponderance before it would be weighed against
aggravation.

See 865 F.2d at 1041. Under Utah's scheme, there

is no burden of proof that defendant must meet in order for the
weighing process to occur. Any juror may hold out against the
death penalty even though other jurors do not find that
mitigation exists, because that juror can fail to find that the
aggravation outweighs the mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt,
or, because he can fail to find that death is appropriate beyond
a reasonable doubt.

Death is not the presumed penalty in Utah

because jurors are free to refrain from imposing death if for any
reason they believe the State has not established its
appropriateness beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Holland, 111

Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 14 (June 22, 1989).
In his zeal to establish that he was prejudiced,
defendant exclaims?

"[n]otably absent from the . . .

instructions and . . . possible verdicts is a verdict option . .

. permitting the jurors to consider and possibly return a verdict
of unanimity on a finding of a life sentence."

App. Br. at 45.

Defendant undoubtedly does not actually intend to propose that
the jury be required to unanimously find that life is the
appropriate penalty.

It is true that life is automatically

imposed by the court where the jury does not find that death is
appropriate.

This, however, benefits defendants, rather than

prejudicing them.

Does defendant wish to create a situation

where a jury that cannot unanimously find death or life is "hung"
and a new penalty hearing is required?

Undoubtedly, he does not.

The problem with defendant's assertion is that, if the
jury were required to return a unanimous verdict of life, Utah's
scheme would most likely violate the very doctrine he urges in
support of the proposition.

Mills v. Maryland,

U.S.

,

, 108 S. Ct. 1860 (1988) struck down a scheme which required a
jury to unanimously find at least one mitigating factor or the
sentence would necessarily be death.

Defendant's proposition

comes perilously close to this scheme.
Interestingly, Mills noted that the Maryland Supreme
Court in upholding Mills' sentence reached a "saving"
interpretation of Maryland's capital sentencing scheme.

108 S.

Ct. at 1863, 1867. The United States Supreme Court reversed,
however, because it was not sure that the jury interpreted the
instructions in the same "saving" manner and found that a
reasonable juror could have employed an impermissible
interpretation.

Nevertheless, that "saving" interpretation is

instructive here because it is quite similar in effect to Utah's

scheme.

Under the Maryland Supreme Court's view Has long as one

juror believes that there exists a mitigating factor, and that
this factor is not outweighed by the aggravating circumstances,
and if such juror continues to adhere to his or h€*r position, the
sentence will not be death under the statutory scheme."

108 S.

Ct. at 1864 (citation omitted).
Defendant asserts that the alleged defect in Utah's
scheme is "even more egregious" than the defect in Mills.

The

State disagrees that there is any defect in Utah's scheme which
allows one hold out juror to cause a life sentence to be imposed.
Defendant's contention is not born by review of Utah's capital
sentencing scheme and it should be rejected.
POINT VII
THE UTAH DEATH PENALTY SCHEME DOES NOT SHIFT
THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE DEFENDANT AT THE
SENTENCING PHASE.
Defendant asserts that this Court erroneously relied on
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S.. 231, 108 S. Ct. 546 (1988), to
find that the Utah death penalty scheme is constitutional.

He

argues that Lowenfield did not decide the issue he raised.

The

issue was:

Whether the defendant bears the burden of proof at

penalty phase to establish mitigation to overcome a presumptive
penalty of death which results from the jury having already found
the aggravating factors to exist beyond a reasonable doubt at
guilt phase.

Defendant's assertion that this Court erred is

incorrect and does not merit rehearing.
In Lowenfield, the Supreme Court rejected the claim
that use at the penalty phase of the sole aggravating

circumstance proven at guilt phase left the jury 'free merely to
repeat one of its findings in the guilt phase, and thus not to
narrow further in the sentencing phase the class of deatheligible murderers."

108 S. Ct. at 553. This issue, stated in

other terms, is the same issue advanced by defendant in this
case.

Defendant complains that there is a presumption of death

unless he can overcome it.

Lowenfield also asserted that the

jury would presume that death was appropriate simply because the
aggravating circumstance had already been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Even if Lowenfield does not answer the question, this
Court has already rejected similar arguments in other death
cases.

Pierre v. Morris, 607 P.2d 812 (Utah 1980), cert, denied,

449 U.S. 891 (1980) held:
Contrary to Pierre's contention, the burden
of proof is not shifted . . . The defendant
is simply afforded the opportunity of
presenting any evidence he may have in
mitigation. The most that can be said . . .
is that the defendant then has the "burden"
of going forward, but only if he so desires.
The burden of proof remains at all times on
the prosecution.
607 P.2d at 815.

Pierre was recently reaffirmed in State v.

Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 460 n.65 (Utah 1988).
What defendant fails to see is that just because the
State has proved that one or more aggravating circumstances exist
beyond a reasonable doubt does not necessarily mean that those
factors will weigh more heavily on a juror's mind than other
factors in the weighing process. The State must still prove that
the aggravation outweighs the mitigation beyond a reasonable

doubt.

State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1982), cert. denied, 459

U.S. 988 (1982).

The jurors could conceivably find mitigation in

the evidence presented at the guilt phase sufficient to prevent a
finding that aggravation outweighs mitigation beyond a reasonable
doubt even if a defendant presents nothing new at the penalty
phase.

Thus, defendant's claim is groundless.
What defendant requests, in essence, is that Utah adopt

a capital punishment scheme that is less restrictive at the guilt
phase than it is now.

Defendant complains that the aggravation

must be proven at the guilt phase, consequently, narrowing the
pool of persons who are eligible for the death penalty before the
penalty phase is even reached.

Defendant's argument is short-

sighted in that he would have more persons proceed to a penalty
phase than do under the existing scheme.

Because Lowenfield

states that narrowing may be done at the guilt phase, defendant's
suggestion need not be adopted.
Defendant asserts that Utah's scheme is
indistinguishable from the Arizona scheme struck down in Adamson
v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1988).

Utah's statute and

the jury instructions in this case are distinguishable from
Arizona's.

In Adamson, the court found constitutional defects in

Arizona's statute because once a single aggravating circumstance
was found, the jury was required to find the existence of
mitigation by a preponderance before it could be weighed against
the aggravation and was further required by statute to find that
mitigation was "sufficiently substantial to call for leniency."
865 F.2d at 1041, quoting A.R.S. S13-703(E).

In contrast, Utah requires the State to prove that
aggravation exists and that it outweighs mitigation and that
death is the appropriate sentence beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 84 (Utah), cert, denied 459 U.S. 988
(1982).

The defendant is not required to prove anything, but may

present any relevant mitigation.

"Thus, the sentencing authority

may refuse to impose the death penalty even though it concedes
that the aggravating circumstances 'outweigh' the mitigating
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt."
Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 14 (June 22, 1989).

State v. Holland, 111

Utah's scheme, therefore,

allows for full consideration of relevant mitigation, does not
presume that death is the appropriate penalty and does not shift
the burden of proof to defendant.

Utah's capital sentencing

scheme is, therefore, constitutional.
POINT VIII
THIS COURT TIMELY DECIDED DEFENDANT'S
INEFFECTIVE COUNSEL CLAIM.
Defendant complains that this Court prematurely decided
his ineffective assistance of counsel claims presented in pro se
documents.

He asserts that an evidentiary hearing was necessary

to establish his claims.

The simple answer to defendant's

complaint is that this Court could adequately review the grounds
that it reviewed from the record established at trial and an
evidentiary hearing was not necessary.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the
defendant must show both that counsel's performance was deficient
in some demonstrable way and that the deficient performance
prejudiced defendant.

State v. Carter, 108 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 15

(May 12, 1989).

Prejudice is shown if the court determines that

if it were not for the performance of counsel, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.

.Id. The court may proceed

directly to the prejudice prong of this test without first
considering whether counsel performed deficiently.

Id.

Defendant complained on appeal that counsel was
ineffective by failing to object to the testimony of Wayne
Jorgensen, Dr. Peter Heinbecker and Dennis Fuchs.

This Court

found that whether or not it was deficient performance for
counsel not to have objected, defendant was not prejudiced by
counsel's performance.

Defendant complains in his petition for

rehearing that he could have established prejudice if given an
opportunity to present evidence.

Defendant confuses the

"prejudice" prong of the test with the "deficient performance"
prong.

Because the Court need not determine that counsel

performed deficiently to determine that there was no prejudice,
no hearing is needed.
Defendant says that he needs to establish a record
about Jorgensen's testimony because defense counsel was unaware
of a possible grounds for suppression of the evidence and did
not, therefore, make a record on the issue.

What defendant

overlooks is that, even if he could show that counsel should have
objected to admission of the evidence in the State's case in
chief, making that record will not establish prejudice.

This

Court determined from the record before it, that even if the
evidence had been suppressed in the State's case in chief, it
would still come in for the purpose it was offered and defendant
was, therefore, not prejudiced by counsel's failure to object.

Defendant further argues that he may not have testified
if counsel had told him that the State could impeach him with his
prior statements.

He complains that counsel did not understand

that the evidence, though possibly suppressible, could be used
for impeachment.

If counsel had understood this point, defendant

alleges, he could have more adequately advised defendant whether
to testify.

The point defendant misses here is that if counsel

believed the evidence came in substantively as defendant claims
he did, counsel already knew defendant could be questioned about
it even if defendant did not deny making the statements.

Thus, a

hearing to establish that counsel thought the evidence came in
substantively would not enlighten the court on the issue of
prejudice.
Next, defendant claims that he needs to present
evidence on whether he was prejudiced by Dr. Heinbecker's or
Dennis Fuch's testimony.

However, this Court has already

determined that even if counsel had objected to Heinbecker's and
Fuch's testimony, the result of the proceeding would not have
been different.
Usually, an evidentiary hearing is not used to
establish that the result of the proceeding would have been
different if counsel had done what he allegedly failed to do.
Instead, it is used to establish that counsel failed to do
something or did something potentially prejudicial that is not
evident in the record.

Here, defendant's claims could be

adequately reviewed because what defendant says is that he would
rather Heinbecker and Fuchs had not said some of the things they

said.

A hearing to establish that counsel would not have used

these two witnesses if he knew what they were going to say does
not establish prejudice, although, it perhaps establishes
deficient performance.

This Court, however, can and did

determine from the record that defendant was not prejudiced by
the evidence even if counsel was deficient in presenting it.
Because there is no reasonable likelihood of a
different result even if counsel had objected to the testimony of
these three witnesses, and because there is an adequate record
from which this Court could determine this issue, no rehearing is
necessary.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court
to deny defendant's request for a rehearing.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 7/h

day of September,

1989.
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